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Over the past decade Serbia has been con-
stantly adjusting its legislation to the Europe-
an: from this angle, therefore, the values pro-
claimed correspond to European criteria and 
standards. However what prevails in everyday 
life is ethno-centrism. Nationalism growingly 
sinks into tribalism. Pluralism, a major attain-
ment of modern liberalism, is permanently 
called on the carpet. The policy of homogeni-
zation breathes life into a monolithic, insular 
and exclusive culture that reflects governmen-
tal and social systems. This policy keeps the so-
ciety in constant tension, intolerance and hos-
tility for others.
Two value concepts clash with one another: the 
predominant, conservative and patriarchal on 
the one hand, and liberal on the other. Ser-
bia parries liberal values. This explains perma-
nent campaigns against the West, free market, 
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capitalism and, especially, human rights cul-
ture perceived as the West’s imperial implant. 
Frequent assaults at human rights defenders 
crystallize this attitude towards human rights. 
Besides, economic stagnation additionally 
spoon-feeds the conservative option and pop-
ulism that has been coming and going in waves 
in the past twenty years.
The political consensus on Serbia’s movements 
towards EU – on the membership of EU with-
out joining NATO – and the “collective state 
of mind,” the social atmosphere of predomi-
nant neo-conservativism, anti=\-Westernism 
and xenophobia, are incongruent. The strong, 
though informal movement for re-tradition-
alism orchestrates the public discourse and 
revives the threatening forms of harassment 
against all those advocating a modern Serbia, 
as a civil society based on anti-fascism and 
contemporary European values (universal hu-
man rights).
The crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea laid bare Serbia’s antipodes: to the gov-
ernment’s ambivalent and relatively restrained 
response to these developments, the media and 
wider public reacted with overt affinity for and 
support to Russia and President Putin. “Serbia’s 
only actual ally is President Putin,” said writer 
Dobrica Ćosić in his last interview.1  
This paradoxical situation is among the con-
sequences of the change of the regime in 2014 
that brought Serb Progressive Party /SNS/ to 
power. The party consolidated itself after the 
elections in 2014 enthroning Aleksandar Vučić 
the premier. The party leadership’s EU option 
contradicts the value system of its electorate. 
Although its leader distance himself declara-
tively from his radical past, the party’s nation-
alistic matrix actually remained the same. As 
it seems this is how many of its supporters 
1   Nedeljnik, April 24, 2014.
concentrated in right-wing organizations and 
groups such as “Naši,” “Dveri,” Serb Popular 
Movement 1389 and the like perceive it. Their 
mentors from the Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/2, 
academic and media circles still largely occupy 
the public scene. Formally, they do not have an 
“authentic” representative in the parliament 
(till 2012 they had been represented by Serb 
Radical Party and Democratic Party of Serbia, 
and in 2012-14 by Democratic Party of Serbia 
alone) by are represented at other levels of the 
government. They are active in many ways. The 
media considerably support them.
Yet another organization ambitious of politics 
has been formed in the meantime – Third Ser-
bia, a recycler of the rest in fact, and of “Dveri” 
in particular. Its declared goal is to reconcile 
the “first” (nationalistic) and the “second” (civ-
il) Serbia. Its program invokes Serbian tradition 
(starting from the Nemanjić dynasty) and pa-
triarchal values. Indicatively, it was launched in 
Vojvodina where it formed a caucus in the lo-
cal parliament of Novi Sad. Even more indica-
tively, its leadership includes many young and 
highly educated persons – most of whom born 
in mid-1970s and mid-1980s. If taken at its 
word, it stands for a “third course” for Serbia 
(a bridge between the other two). On the other 
hand, its representatively smoothly cooperate 
with SNS at local level where they are usually 
appointed managers of cultural institutions.
For quarter of a century the nationalistic-
conservative bloc has been using same meth-
ods, lists of “public enemies” being the most 
2   In the special prayer on the occasion of recent floods 
Partriarh Irinej called this natural disaster „God’s warn-
ing“ to those many who „have chosen the path of vice 
and malice.“ „Lawlessness and dark vice reign Belgrade, 
and many are proud of it and want democracy for them-
selves,“ he said. The Patriarch obviously referred to LGBT 
population and the Pride Parade announced for late May 
(LGBT organizations have themselves cancelled the pa-
rade); Danas, May 16, 2014.
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frequent among them. Human rights defend-
ers, some journalists and, generally, public 
figures perceived as “anti-Serbs” and “auto-
chauvinists” top these lists. They are being 
discredited in other ways too – publicly called 
to the carpet, slandered and insulted. The bloc 
tries to impose “an authentic model of lan-
guage and alphabet” on the general public, 
the model that would not be undermined by 
“foreign words” and Latin script. It insists that 
people from ethnic minority groups speak the 
Serb language (the initiative for “language 
patrols”).3
What seriously questions the regime’s pro-
claimed course to Europe is its policy for the 
media that are even officially under its control 
and state-owned to large extent. This primarily 
refers to most influential opinion-makers such 
as Politika and Vecernje Novosti. Once it formed 
the ruling coalition, SNS appointed “anti-EU” 
figures editors in chief of these two dailies: in 
Politika, it appointed Ljiljana Smajlović, close to 
DSS, and in Vecernje Novosti Ratko Dmitrović, 
a notorious warmonger in 1990s and presently 
close to the pro-Russian magazine, Pecat.
Over the past months many inappropriate and 
insulting messages have been put across to 
Podgorica and Montenegrin leadership via Bel-
grade’s media scene. The “authors” have mostly 
been Russian officials to whose undiplomatic 
acts the host country failed to react. Such at-
titude largely devalues the official Belgrade’s 
pledge to improve relations with neighboring 
countries, including Montenegro.
3   DSS branch in Vojvodina said it would organize “lan-
guage patrols” to patrol the towns in Vojvodina with the 
Hungarian majority and see whether local Hungarian 
knew how to speak Serbian. These patrol will not be raid-
ing houses and apartments (for the time being), but will 
be testing citizens’ knowledge of the Serbian language 
“in public places, at counters, in shops, etc.,” says Milen-
ko Jerkov of the DSS branch.  
Though information about sources and 
amounts of financial assistance to certain right-
wing organizations, movements and the media 
(Pecat) are not available one should not pre-
clude the possibility of Russia as the main fi-
nancier the more so since Russia has been sup-
porting scores of extreme rightist organizations 
throughout Europe. 
RUSSIaN OFFENSIVE 
The media in Serbia have almost unanimously 
sided with Russia over the Ukrainian drama 
and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In other 
works, they are uncritically transmitting Krem-
lin’s stances on domestic situation in Ukraine 
(claiming that Ukrainian right-wing fascists had 
provoked the chaos with ample assistance of 
Washington and Brussels, that illegal, “putsch-
ist” regime governs in Kiev, that Crimea has il-
legally seceded from Russia, and the like). Such 
reporting is not actually in line with the offi-
cial Belgrade’s stance, which is ambivalent and 
more restrained. Since President Putin like to 
compare Crimea and Kosovo, Serbia claims that 
it supports sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of every country, including Ukraine. On the 
other hand, due to its friendly ties with Mos-
cow Serbia would not pursue EU policy imply-
ing sanctions against Russia. Because of such 
attitude Belgrade is under considerable pres-
sure from both sides.
While EU officials say they respect Serbia’s at-
titude for the time being, Russia is testing Ser-
bia’s friendship: it keeps sending out its offi-
cials – including those blacklisted in EU mem-
ber-states such as President of Duma Sergey 
Narikshin4 - to Serbia.
4   According to the Danas daily Serbia’s delegates to Mos-
cow “waged a trench warfare” against Narishkin’s visit; 
and, should that be unavoidable, they tried their best to 
prevent him from meeting the “most powerful man” in 
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Among them was retired general Leonid 
Reshetnikov, director of the Russia’s Institute 
for Strategic Studies. His book “Return to Rus-
sia” was ceremoniously launched to a large 
audience, including academicians and church 
dignitaries. Addressing the launch Reshetnikov 
called Montenegrin Premier Milo Đukanović 
a traitor of the Serbian people’s historical re-
membrance. “Never in history have the Serbian 
people – and Montenegrins are part of them – 
stood against Russia. That’s a high treason for 
which Đukanović will be doomed,” he said.5 On 
the same occasion Archbishop of Montenegro 
Amfilohije hardly picked his words while curs-
ing Đukanović (later on he sort of distanced 
himself from his speech). Russia is presently on 
the offensive that relies on restoration of “Rus-
sian values” and Eastern Orthodox civilization. 
In theory, it leans on Huntington’s thesis about 
the clash of civilizations. In this context Rus-
sia has intensified its presence in all ex-Soviet 
republics but also in the Balkans. Serbia plays 
an important role in the Balkans from Russia’s 
standpoint: most of Serbia’s elite has not genu-
inely opted for EU integration.
At the same time Serbia hosted Russian MP 
Konstantin Kosachev who had come to dis-
cuss the restoration of Russian necropolis in 
Belgrade.
As Russia went on the offensive of sorts short-
ly after constitution of Serbia’ parliament and 
government, everything coincided with visits 
by EU officials Catherine Ashton and Stefan 
Fule. After his meeting with Fule, Aleksandar 
the country, Premier Vučić. Narishkin did pay a visit to 
Belgrade but not to Vučić; Danas, May 10-11, 2014.  
5   A quote from Sonja Biserko’s address at the launch of 
the book “Whitewashing Democracy” by Boris Varga on 
May 7, in Novi Sad. Several months ago, former Rus-
sian Ambassador Aleksandar Chepurkin also brutally in-
sulted Montenegro and its leadership in Belgrade (call-
ing them monkeys) after Montenegro applied to NATO 
membership. 
Vučić told the press that “talks were tougher 
than he had expected.”6 From this journalists 
concluded that Brussels had asked Serbia to 
impose sanctions on Russia. “Serbia respects 
territorial integrity of every country, including 
Ukraine,” said Vučić, adding, “I pleaded against 
sanctions on the account of Serbia’s traditional, 
historical and other ties with Russia.”7 Stefan 
Fule then said that “EU respects Serbia’s atti-
tude towards Moscow.”8   
THE MEDIa: CHaMPIONS 
OF aNTI-WESTERNISM 
Having reported developments in Ukraine dur-
ing pro-European demonstrations at the Maid-
an Square rather objectively, the media in Ser-
bia – tabloids and the so-called serious papers 
almost without any exception - changed their 
tune after Russia’s intervention and annexation 
of Crimea. The media used US President Barack 
Obama’s statement about Kosovo’s referendum 
on independence having been in line with the 
international law, while the Crimean had not, 
to spread anti-American feelings.9 They be-
gun reinterpreting the Maidan developments 
and accusing US (and their secret services) and 
Ukrainian right-wing organizations of hav-
ing organized the protests. They also started 
criticizing the West’s sanctions against Russia 
claiming the purpose was not to help solving 
the crisis Ukraine but to punish Russia.10
Right-wing organizations, for their part, start-
ed calling human rights defenders and some 
6   Politika, May 6, 2014.
7   Ibid.
8   Ibid.
9   It was the Kosovo Parliament that declared independ-
ence without calling a referendum on the issue. 
10   “It is Russia rather than Ukraine that concerns the 
West. And if Ukraine has to be sacrificed in the showdown 
with Russia, its /Ukraine’s/ friends in the West would only 
be glad to oblige,” quotes the editorial headlined “Russia 
Haunts Europe;” Politika, May 6, 2014. 
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media outlets on the carpet. In this context, an 
editorial penned by Ratko Dmitrović, editor of 
Vecernje Novosti, stood up as a drastic exam-
ple. Under the headline “Kristijan and Some 
Others,”11 Dmitrović called for a ban on Jelena 
Milić’s (director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic 
Studies) and Sonja Biserko’s (chairwoman of 
the Helsinki Committee) public appearances, 
calling them notorious “anti-Serbs” and “trai-
tors.” What motivated his editorial was a hue 
and cry raised about frequent appearances as 
a guest in talk shows of Kristijan Golubović, 
a convicted criminal and drug dealer. Why 
shouldn’t then the authorities ban the two civil 
society activists’ from appearing in talk shows 
considering their “anti-Serb” stances, wanders 
Dmitrović. 
Michael Davenport, head of the EU Delegation 
to Serbia, reacted at the editorial.12 He called 
the overall state of the Serbian media unsatis-
factory and some phenomena “very unpleas-
ant and unacceptable.”13 Here he referred to 
comparisons made between civil society rep-
resentatives and criminals, saying that was “a 
clear breach of human rights, as well as rights 
of these individuals and organizations.”14 
In the name of freedom of speech and expres-
sion, Politika promptly retorted to Michael 
Davenport’s statement: it compared it with 
Central Committee releases in the socialist era, 
which “were hurriedly parroted and quoted by 
everybody.”15       
                                                                                           
11   Večernje Novosti, April 26, 2014.
12   On the account of Serbia’s cooperativeness in the mat-
ter of Kosovo EU officials have been lenient about do-
mestic situation, including breaches of fundamental 
standards of ethics and professionalism in the media.  
13   Politika, May 12, 2014.
14   Ibid.
15   Politika, May 14, 2014.
Director and editor of Pečat Milorad Vučelić 
was the first to suggest that the media should 
simply ignore outstanding human rights de-
fenders such as Sonja Biserko. His weekly 
overtly advocates against Serbia’s membership 
of EU taking that its /Serbia’s/ place is “in the 
East.” Compared with other weeklies this one 
has enviable circulation and influence on gen-
eral public. 
The word has it that Russia directly subsidizes 
Pecat for its overt support to it and its foreign 
policy, and especially its favoring Vladimir Pu-
tin, and that it supports some right-wing or-
ganizations for the same reasons. Should that 
be the case the financial support would be 
rather non-transparent (unlike Western donors 
that finance non-governmental organizations 
and insist on transparency of the grants and 
expenditures). Be it as it may, Milorad Vučelić 
vehemently denies everything, claiming that 
his weekly get “nothing special from Russia” 
and that in his opinion “business circles in 
Moscow and their companies in Serbia have 
never demonstrated that they are aware of him 
at all.”16
It is common knowledge, however, that Russia 
provides logistic and financial support to scores 
of right-wing organizations in West Europe, in-
cluding pro-fascist parties, although it has been 
articulating – and especially since the outburst 
of the Ukrainian crisis – its concern over the 
rise of fascism in Europe. (“We shall not al-
low fascism to resurrect in Europe,” says Ser-
gey Lavrov adding, “Europe has been turning 
a blind eye to the reawaken fascist ideology for 
long.”) According to Politika, Moscow wants to 
instigate a political Internationale that would 
lead towards a “Euro-Asian confederation of 
free nations” by the means of “nationalistic 
impulses” that had found an echo among ex-
treme rightist circles.17
16   Danas, May 12, 2014.
17   Politika, May 9, 2014.
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The paper also says that “Russia’s right-wing 
favorites” are the National Front in France, 
Flanders Interest in Belgium, Italy’s Northern 
League, Austria’s Freedom Party, Hungary’s Jo-
bik and Bulgaria’s Ataka.18
THIRD SERBIa: RECyCLER 
OF CONSERVaTIVISM 
The Third Serbia (assembling former members 
of the right-wing movement Dveri) stepped on 
the political scene after the 2012 elections and 
SNS parliamentary and presidential victory. Up 
to then, as a new grouping going “after recon-
ciliation between the first and the second Ser-
bia,” it had acted from the margins little known 
to general public. However, the “recomposi-
tion” of local government in Novi Sad – when 
SNS dethroned DS – opened a window of op-
portunity to the Third Serbia to delegate its 
members to governmental institutions. With 
two MPs in the provincial parliament it formed 
a parliamentary caucus.19 The Third Serbia is 
actually an informal coalition partner to the 
present regime, which deploys it whenever it 
either cannot or would not expose itself. Hence 
its considerable presence in the media, in Vo-
jvodina in particular. 
Its officials are preoccupied with the alleged 
problem of “Serb self-denial.” And here they 
specifically emphasize Vojvodina as a “para-
digm of Serb self-denial.”20 According to Andrej 
Fajgelj, a high party official mostly exposed in 
the media, “the culture of self-denial has been 
developed for more than a hundred years.” 
“This cultural war broke up when a new genera-
tion stood up for Serbhood, the generation that 
stands a good chance to finally defend it.”21  
18   Politika, May 9, 2014.
19   The party did not pass the electoral threshold in the 
early parliamentary elections in 2014. 
20   Danas, May 16, 2014.
21   Politika, May 4, 2014.
To all appearances, Andrej Fajgelj considers 
himself a part of that generation. After the “re-
composition” of the local government in 2012 
he was appointed director of the Novi Sad Cul-
tural Center instead of Laslo Blašković. His first 
move in the new post was to replace the Latin 
script in the Center’s name and logo with Cy-
rillic. This announced the course of his policy. 
Then he banned a painting by a young artist 
(Danijela Tasić) from an exhibition because, he 
explained, the painting insulted citizens’ reli-
gious feelings (the painting represented Jesus 
dressed in banknotes). His action raised a hue 
and cry about censorship. 
For his part, Fajgelj called his critics to account 
for not protesting against “censorship” when 
the launch of a book relativizing the Srebreni-
ca genocide (“The Srebrenica Fraud”) was sus-
pended. The launch scheduled in the Center of 
Serbian Army had been suspended at the re-
quest of the Humanitarian Law Fund.
What earmarks the Third Serbia’s program are 
“traditional Serb values,” the family in the first 
place. For the time being it mostly acts in Vo-
jvodina. It considers itself an engine of devel-
opment but its stances are close to those of 
the most conservative intellectual circles. True, 
the party does not advocate annulment of Vo-
jvodina’s autonomy. On the other hand, it in-
sists that the question about “whether we re-
ally need an autonomous province” should 
be raised.22  “We should also raise a question 
of whether all this implies elements of a qua-
si-state, and whether citizens of the province 
really need banners, emblems, statutes, acad-
emies of science and the police of their own, or 
they need a flexible and modern governance 
integrated into the whole of Serbia’s system,” 
says Fajgelj.23
22   Aleksandar Đurđev u autorskom tekstu za Danas, 16. 
maj 2014.
23   Isto.
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CONCLUSION 
The idea of (ethnic) purity negates democracy and liberal values. Therefore, a state is obliged 
to cherish diversity and aspire to harmony rather than to uniformity. Unfortunately, Serbia 
stands for it in words only. In fact, Serbia is an extremely ethno-centric society.
The Serbian society badly needs another wave of democratization to promote liberal values; it 
needs to focus itself on education and promotion of liberal values (freedom, truth, pluralism, 
tolerance, diversity) through the educational system.
Serbia needs a systematic, alternative education based on these values.
The media that promote liberal values need to be supported.
Protection of human rights defenders is imperative – as they symbolize the “otherness.” A 
youth network to react against all forms of extremism and advocates of intolerance and a uni-
form and closed society is also an imperative.
Over the accession negotiations with Serbia EU should pay more heed to education and promo-
tion of liberal values. In this context, EU should be more present in the Serbian society.
